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  1. About

    About Cyber School
  2. About BDO
  3. The CSRP program Syllabus
  4. Module 1
    The Cyber World and CIA Triad
    6 Topics
  5. The OSI Model and Network Layers
    6 Topics
  6. IP Addressing, Subnetting and Routing
    6 Topics
  7. DNS and DHCP
    6 Topics
  8. Windows Server Administration
    6 Topics
  9. Active Directory and Identity Management
    6 Topics
  10. Linux CLI Fundamentals
    6 Topics
  11. Linux Permissions and Hardening
    6 Topics
  12. Module 2 - Defense Technologies and Cyber Tools
    Firewall Architecture and Rule Design
    5 Topics
  13. NAT and Secure Traffic Mapping
    6 Topics
  14. Enterprise VPN Solutions
    6 Topics
  15. IDS and IPS
    5 Topics
  16. Identity and Access Management
    5 Topics
  17. Multi-Factor Authentication
    6 Topics
  18. Data Loss Prevention
    6 Topics
  19. Endpoint Security and EDR
    6 Topics
  20. Mail Security
    6 Topics
  21. Web Proxy and URL Filtering
    6 Topics
  22. Regulation and Compliance
    6 Topics
  23. Cloud Security
    6 Topics
    |
    1 Quiz
  24. Module 3 - Ai in security
    AI in Security
    5 Topics
  25. ML Anomaly Detection
    5 Topics
  26. AI Threats
    5 Topics
  27. LLM Defense
    6 Topics
  28. Module 4 - Offensive Cyber & Vulnerability Scanning
    Cyber Kill Chain and Attacker Mindset
    6 Topics
  29. OSINT and Public Intelligence Gathering
    6 Topics
  30. Network and Port Scanning with Nmap
    6 Topics
  31. Vulnerability Scanning
    6 Topics
  32. Exploitation Fundamentals
    6 Topics
  33. Web Application Security
    5 Topics
  34. Social Engineering
    5 Topics
  35. Password and Hash Cracking
    5 Topics
  36. Module 5 - SOC and Advance Cyber Analyst
    SOC Structure and Operations
    6 Topics
  37. SIEM Fundamentals with Splunk
    6 Topics
  38. Alerting and Dashboards
    6 Topics
  39. Incident Response
    5 Topics
  40. Basic Digital Forensics
  41. Capstone A - The Attack: Breaching Meridian
  42. Capstone B - The Defense: Defending Meridian
  43. ISC2 CC Mock Exam and CSRP Graduation
    2 Quizzes
Lesson 4, Topic 4
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The Cyber World and CIA Triad Terminology Bank

Cyber School 23/11/2026
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CSRP  —  Cyber Security Responder & Practitioner

Lesson 1: The Cyber World and CIA Triad

Terminology Bank

Cyber School  ·  BDO Ziv Haft

TERMINOLOGY BANK (cyberPedia feed)

Lesson 1 — The Cyber World and the CIA Triad

A structured glossary of every technical term introduced in Lesson 1. Each entry feeds the course-wide cyberPedia — a searchable glossary visible across the CSRP LMS. Cross-links between entries are written as [[term-slug]] — the cyberPedia renderer resolves them to anchors.

Header

FieldValue
Lesson1 — The Cyber World and the CIA Triad
Total terms30
First-introduced terms30 (Lesson 1 is the first lesson — every term is new)

The CIA triad

CIA Triad

  • Hebrew: משולש ה-CIA / שלושת עקרונות אבטחת המידע
  • Acronym: CIA = Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability
  • Category: Security — foundational model
  • Short: Three properties of information that security controls protect: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.
  • Long: The CIA triad is the most important model in information security. It gives defenders a shared, precise vocabulary for what was harmed in any given incident: confidentiality (someone saw what they shouldn’t have), integrity (data was altered without authorization), or availability (a system was made unusable). One event can violate more than one pillar — ransomware classically violates all three. Every security control you’ll ever configure protects at least one of the three.
  • Why it matters to a defender: the daily mental model. When triaging an incident, the first question is “which pillar was harmed?” That answer drives the response.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [confidentiality], [integrity], [availability]
  • Reference: NIST FIPS 199 — https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/199/final

Confidentiality

  • Hebrew: סודיות
  • Acronym: —
  • Category: CIA pillar
  • Short: The property that information is available only to those authorized to see it.
  • Long: Confidentiality is violated when data is disclosed to someone who should not have it — an unauthorized employee reading a salary file, a stolen unencrypted laptop, a publicly exposed database. Defenders protect confidentiality with access control, the principle of least privilege, and encryption (both at rest and in transit). Note: “secure” is not the same as “confidential” — encryption alone does not protect availability or integrity.
  • Why it matters to a defender: disclosure of sensitive data is often the most visible (and legally consequential) kind of security failure. Confidentiality controls are the front line.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [[cia-triad]], [[access-control]], [[least-privilege]], [encryption]
  • Reference: NIST FIPS 199; CSRP Textbook L1 §2

Integrity

  • Hebrew: שלמות (המידע)
  • Acronym: —
  • Category: CIA pillar
  • Short: The property that information is accurate, complete, and has not been altered in an unauthorized way.
  • Long: Integrity failures are particularly dangerous because they often go unnoticed — a silently edited bank balance, a swapped software update, a deleted log entry. The defender’s foundational tool for catching integrity violations is the hash (a one-way fingerprint of data) deployed through File Integrity Monitoring (FIM). Integrity is also protected by digital signatures (which add authentication) and input validation (which prevents corruption at the source).
  • Why it matters to a defender: unlike confidentiality (where the violation is often visible) and availability (where users complain immediately), integrity failures can persist for months. FIM is your detection lifeline.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [[cia-triad]], [[hash]], [[fim]], [[digital-signature]]
  • Reference: NIST FIPS 199; CSRP Textbook L1 §3

Availability

  • Hebrew: זמינות
  • Acronym: —
  • Category: CIA pillar
  • Short: The property that systems and data are usable by authorized users when they need them.
  • Long: Availability is the pillar beginners forget but the one businesses feel most acutely. Threats include denial-of-service attacks, ransomware, and ordinary hardware and human failures. Defenders protect availability with redundancy (multiple of everything critical), backups (clean copies for restoration), and disaster-recovery planning (tested procedures for bringing systems back). Importantly, availability is a property OVER TIME — starting a service once is not the same as keeping it up.
  • Why it matters to a defender: every minute of downtime has a measurable cost. Availability engineering is a major sub-discipline of both security and operations.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [[cia-triad]], [redundancy], [backup], [[disaster-recovery]], [[denial-of-service]]
  • Reference: NIST SP 800-34 — https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/34/r1/final

The defender’s mindset

Blue Team / Defender

  • Hebrew: צוות כחול / מגן
  • Acronym: —
  • Category: Security — role
  • Short: The people responsible for protecting an organization’s systems and data — designing controls, monitoring for problems, and responding to incidents.
  • Long: Blue team is one half of the offence/defence pair in modern security. Defenders harden configurations, monitor for anomalies, write detection rules, run incident response, and maintain compliance. CSRP trains primarily blue-team practitioners, though learners study offensive techniques later (Module 4) because effective defence requires understanding attackers.
  • Why it matters to a defender: this is the role the entire course prepares you for.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [[red-team]], [[soc]], [[incident-response]]
  • Reference: CSRP Textbook L1 §1.2

Red Team / Attacker (ethical)

  • Hebrew: צוות אדום / תוקף
  • Acronym: —
  • Category: Security — role
  • Short: Security professionals who simulate attacker behaviour to test defences — ethically, under authorization.
  • Long: Red teams probe systems for weaknesses the way real attackers would, but operate under explicit contractual authority. Their work — penetration tests, red-team engagements — produces findings the blue team then fixes. The two roles are complementary, not adversarial.
  • Why it matters to a defender: understanding offensive techniques is essential to building effective defences. You’ll study red-team tools in Module 4.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [[blue-team]], [[penetration-testing]]
  • Reference: CSRP Textbook L1 §1.2

Reduce / Detect / Respond

  • Hebrew: הפחתה / זיהוי / תגובה
  • Acronym: —
  • Category: Security — doctrine
  • Short: The three-verb description of the defender’s realistic goal: reduce risk to an acceptable level, detect problems quickly, and respond to limit damage.
  • Long: This formula replaces the unrealistic goal of “perfect security.” Modern defence assumes breach — that some attack will eventually succeed — and focuses on minimising likelihood of success, time to detection, and time to containment. The famous metrics MTTD (mean time to detect) and MTTR (mean time to respond) come from this doctrine.
  • Why it matters to a defender: the daily prioritisation rule. Anything you do should reduce risk, improve detection, or shorten response. If it does none of those, question it.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [risk], [[incident-response]], [[mtt-d-r]]
  • Reference: CSRP Textbook L1 §1.2

Threat actors

Threat Actor

  • Hebrew: גורם איום
  • Acronym: —
  • Category: Security — taxonomy
  • Short: Any individual or group capable of carrying out a cyber attack.
  • Long: Threat actors differ in skill, motivation, and resources. Common categories: opportunistic attackers (curious, low skill), cybercriminals (motivated by money), insiders (already trusted, can be malicious or accidental), hacktivists (motivated by ideology), and nation-state APT groups (skilled, patient, well-funded).
  • Why it matters to a defender: different actors require different defensive priorities. An organisation worried about insider risk emphasises least privilege; one worried about ransomware emphasises backups; one worried about APTs emphasises detection depth.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [[apt]], [[insider-threat]], [[cybercriminal]], [[hacktivist]]
  • Reference: Verizon DBIR — https://www.verizon.com/business/resources/reports/dbir/

APT (Advanced Persistent Threat)

  • Hebrew: איום מתמשך ומתקדם
  • Acronym: APT = Advanced Persistent Threat
  • Category: Threat actor — category
  • Short: A skilled, well-resourced adversary that gains access and stays hidden over a long period to pursue a specific objective.
  • Long: APT groups are typically nation-state-affiliated or nation-state-grade in capability. The defining word is persistent: they do not give up after one failed attempt; they remain inside the environment for months or years, often laterally moving toward specific targets (intellectual property, classified information, strategic infrastructure). Famous APT groups are catalogued by MITRE and threat-intelligence vendors with codenames like APT28, APT29, Lazarus Group.
  • Why it matters to a defender: APTs are the worst case. Defending against them requires deep monitoring, segmentation, and long-baseline anomaly detection. They cannot be stopped at the front door alone.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [[threat-actor]], [[lateral-movement]], [[mitre-attack]]
  • Reference: MITRE ATT&CK — https://attack.mitre.org/

Insider Threat

  • Hebrew: איום פנים-ארגוני
  • Acronym: —
  • Category: Threat actor — category
  • Short: A current or former employee, contractor, or partner who poses a security risk — either through deliberate malicious action or honest error.
  • Long: Insiders are dangerous because they are already trusted: they have credentials, knowledge of internal systems, and access to data. Malicious insiders may steal data, sabotage systems, or sell credentials. Accidental insiders may misconfigure systems or fall for phishing. Least privilege is the primary mitigation: limit what any individual can do, so the damage from compromise (intentional or accidental) is bounded.
  • Why it matters to a defender: statistically a major share of breaches involve insider action — making least privilege one of the highest-leverage controls.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [[threat-actor]], [[least-privilege]]
  • Reference: CSRP Textbook L1 §1.3

Ransomware

  • Hebrew: כופרה
  • Acronym: —
  • Category: Attack pattern
  • Short: Malicious software that encrypts an organization’s data and demands payment for decryption, often after first stealing a copy of the data.
  • Long: Modern ransomware violates all three CIA pillars simultaneously: it steals data first (confidentiality), encrypts the originals (integrity — files are altered without authorisation), and prevents the business from using them (availability). The standard recovery strategy is tested backups + strong segmentation + an incident-response plan. Paying the ransom is increasingly avoided.
  • Why it matters to a defender: ransomware is the dominant criminal cyber pattern of the 2020s. Every organisation should have a ransomware-specific response plan.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [[cybercriminal]], [backup], [[incident-response]], [[cia-triad]]
  • Reference: CISA Ransomware Guide — https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/

Phishing

  • Hebrew: פישינג / דיוג
  • Acronym: —
  • Category: Attack pattern
  • Short: A social-engineering attack that tricks a user into giving up credentials or running malicious code, typically via deceptive email or messaging.
  • Long: Phishing is the most common way attackers gain initial access. Variants include spear-phishing (targeted to specific individuals), whaling (targeted to executives), smishing (SMS), and vishing (voice). Defences include user training, email-security gateways (SPF/DKIM/DMARC), multi-factor authentication, and detection rules for suspicious behaviour post-click.
  • Why it matters to a defender: the most common foothold attackers use. Reducing phishing success rate has outsized impact on overall breach reduction.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [[social-engineering]], [[mfa]]
  • Reference: Verizon DBIR — annual phishing statistics

Confidentiality controls

Access Control

  • Hebrew: בקרת גישה
  • Acronym: —
  • Category: Security control
  • Short: Deciding who can do what to which resource, and enforcing that decision.
  • Long: Access control is the everyday workhorse of confidentiality. It includes authentication (proving you are who you claim to be), authorization (deciding what you may do), and audit (recording what was actually done). Common models: discretionary access control (DAC), role-based access control (RBAC), and attribute-based access control (ABAC). Concrete artifacts: ACLs, group memberships, file permissions.
  • Why it matters to a defender: every confidentiality conversation starts with “who can access this?”
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [[least-privilege]], [[rbac]], [[authentication]], [[authorization]]
  • Reference: NIST SP 800-53 AC family — https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/final

Least Privilege

  • Hebrew: הרשאה מינימלית
  • Acronym: —
  • Category: Security principle
  • Short: Each user, process, or program should have the minimum access required to do its job — and nothing more.
  • Long: Least privilege is one of the foundational principles of secure system design. It limits both honest mistakes (a salesperson can’t accidentally delete the payroll file if they can’t access it) and the damage attackers can do with stolen accounts (a compromised salesperson account doesn’t yield payroll data either). The two halves of least privilege are: REMOVE access for those who don’t need it, and GRANT access only to those who do. Both halves required.
  • Why it matters to a defender: the single highest-leverage access-control habit. Failures of least privilege explain a huge share of real-world breach magnitudes.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [[access-control]], [[need-to-know]], [[rbac]]
  • Reference: NIST SP 800-53 AC-6 — Least Privilege

Encryption

  • Hebrew: הצפנה
  • Acronym: —
  • Category: Security control
  • Short: Transforming data into a form unreadable without a key, so even if the data is intercepted or stolen, it cannot be read.
  • Long: Encryption applies at multiple stages of the data lifecycle: at rest (on disk, in databases), in transit (across networks, e.g., TLS), and increasingly in use (homomorphic encryption, secure enclaves). Symmetric encryption uses one shared key (AES is standard); asymmetric encryption uses a public/private key pair (RSA, ECDHE). Strong encryption depends on strong key management — losing or leaking the key defeats the system.
  • Why it matters to a defender: primary confidentiality control. Disk encryption protects stolen laptops; TLS protects data in transit; database encryption protects exposed backups.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [confidentiality], [[tls]], [[key-management]]
  • Reference: NIST SP 800-175B — Guideline for using cryptographic standards

Integrity controls

Hash (Digest / Fingerprint)

  • Hebrew: האש / טביעת אצבע / תקציר
  • Acronym: —
  • Category: Cryptographic primitive
  • Short: A one-way, fixed-length representation of data used to detect change. The same input always produces the same digest; any change to the input produces a completely different digest.
  • Long: Hash functions take any input — a file, a message, a password — and produce a short, fixed-length output. Critically, they are one-way: you cannot reconstruct the input from the digest. Common algorithms: SHA-256 (current standard), SHA-512 (longer digest), and the deprecated MD5 and SHA-1 (do not use for security). Properties: deterministic (same input → same digest), avalanche (one-bit change → completely different digest), collision-resistant (two different inputs producing the same digest is computationally infeasible).
  • Why it matters to a defender: the foundation of File Integrity Monitoring, digital signatures, password storage, blockchain, and code-signing. You will see hashes daily.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [[fim]], [sha-256], [[digital-signature]]
  • Reference: NIST FIPS 180-4 (Secure Hash Standard) — https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/180/4/final

FIM (File Integrity Monitoring)

  • Hebrew: ניטור שלמות קבצים
  • Acronym: FIM
  • Category: Security control / tooling category
  • Short: A control that stores a baseline of file fingerprints and alerts when any monitored file’s fingerprint no longer matches the baseline.
  • Long: FIM detects the effect of an intrusion — files changed — even when the cause is unknown. Industry-standard FIM tools include Tripwire, OSSEC, AIDE, and Wazuh. FIM is required by several compliance frameworks (PCI-DSS, HIPAA, SOX). It works at the directory level, file level, or registry level (on Windows). Typical workflow: define which files to monitor → capture a baseline of their hashes → schedule periodic re-checks → alert on any mismatch.
  • Why it matters to a defender: primary integrity-detection control. The Challenge in Lesson 1 simulates exactly the kind of alert a real FIM would fire.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [[hash]], [integrity], [[siem]]
  • Reference: PCI-DSS v4 §11.5 — Change detection mechanism

SHA-256

  • Hebrew: SHA-256
  • Acronym: SHA = Secure Hash Algorithm; 256 = 256-bit output length
  • Category: Hash algorithm
  • Short: A widely-deployed cryptographic hash function that produces a 256-bit (64-character hex) digest.
  • Long: SHA-256 is part of the SHA-2 family standardised by NIST in FIPS 180-4. It is currently considered secure for general-purpose integrity use and is the default choice in most modern systems (TLS certificates, Bitcoin, code signing, FIM). For password hashing specifically, use a slow KDF like bcrypt, scrypt, or Argon2 — SHA-256 is too fast for passwords on its own.
  • Why it matters to a defender: the hash you’ll meet most often. You should be able to recognise a SHA-256 digest by sight (64 hex characters).
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [[hash]], [[fim]]
  • Reference: NIST FIPS 180-4

Digital Signature

  • Hebrew: חתימה דיגיטלית
  • Acronym: —
  • Category: Cryptographic primitive
  • Short: A cryptographic mechanism that proves a piece of data was produced by a specific party AND has not been altered since.
  • Long: Digital signatures combine hashing with asymmetric cryptography. The signer hashes the data, then encrypts the hash with their private key. Anyone with the corresponding public key can verify the signature by decrypting and comparing. Used in code signing, TLS certificates, email (S/MIME, PGP), and increasingly document workflows.
  • Why it matters to a defender: digital signatures are the strongest combined integrity + authentication mechanism. You’ll meet them in TLS (Lesson 2+) and code signing (Module 2).
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [[hash]], [[asymmetric-cryptography]], [[tls]]
  • Reference: NIST FIPS 186-5

Availability controls

Redundancy

  • Hebrew: יתירות
  • Acronym: —
  • Category: Availability control
  • Short: Having more than one of every critical component so a single failure does not cause an outage.
  • Long: Redundancy can be at every layer: redundant power supplies, redundant network paths, redundant disks (RAID), redundant servers (HA clusters), redundant data centers (geo-replication). The concept extends to processes too — redundant on-call rotations, redundant runbook ownership. Trade-off: redundancy costs money and adds operational complexity; over-redundancy is a real failure mode.
  • Why it matters to a defender: primary availability engineering tool. Most prolonged outages reduce to “a redundancy assumption was wrong.”
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [availability], [[high-availability]], [[failover]]
  • Reference: NIST SP 800-34

Backup

  • Hebrew: גיבוי
  • Acronym: —
  • Category: Availability + integrity control
  • Short: A separate, recoverable copy of data, ideally offline or otherwise immutable, used to restore systems after data loss, corruption, or ransomware.
  • Long: Backups serve two CIA pillars: availability (restore service after data loss) and integrity (revert to known-good state after corruption). The standard rule of thumb is the 3-2-1 rule: three copies of data, on two different media, with one copy offsite. Modern variants add “immutable” (cannot be modified or deleted by an attacker) and “tested” (verified by actual restoration drills, not just successful backup completion).
  • Why it matters to a defender: the single most important defence against ransomware. Tested backups turn a catastrophic ransomware event into an inconvenient recovery exercise.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [availability], [[disaster-recovery]], [ransomware]
  • Reference: NIST SP 800-34; CISA Ransomware Guide

Disaster Recovery (DR)

  • Hebrew: התאוששות מאסון / DR
  • Acronym: DR
  • Category: Availability practice
  • Short: A tested set of procedures and resources to restore systems and data after a major incident.
  • Long: DR encompasses the planning, documentation, infrastructure, and rehearsal needed to recover from disasters — natural, technical, or adversarial. Key metrics: RTO (Recovery Time Objective — how fast must we be back?) and RPO (Recovery Point Objective — how much data can we afford to lose?). A DR plan is meaningless if untested; tabletop exercises and live failover drills are the verification.
  • Why it matters to a defender: the difference between “we have backups” and “we can actually use them in a crisis.”
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [availability], [backup], [[business-continuity]]
  • Reference: NIST SP 800-34; ISO 22301

Denial of Service (DoS / DDoS)

  • Hebrew: מניעת שירות / DoS, DDoS
  • Acronym: DoS = Denial of Service; DDoS = Distributed Denial of Service
  • Category: Attack pattern
  • Short: An attack that floods or otherwise overwhelms a service so legitimate users cannot use it.
  • Long: DoS attacks target availability directly. Distributed DoS (DDoS) amplifies the attack by using many sources — often a botnet. Defences include traffic scrubbing (CDNs, dedicated DDoS providers), rate limiting, anycast networks, and capacity planning. Detection involves traffic-volume anomalies and protocol-level signatures (e.g., SYN-flood patterns).
  • Why it matters to a defender: common, cheap to launch, and extremely disruptive. Every internet-facing service should have a DDoS plan.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [availability], [[botnet]]
  • Reference: NIST SP 800-61 §3.2 (attack types)

Risk vocabulary

Risk

  • Hebrew: סיכון
  • Acronym: —
  • Category: Risk management
  • Short: The combination of how likely a harmful event is and how severe its impact would be: Risk = Likelihood × Impact.
  • Long: Risk is the central language of security prioritisation. Every control reduces some specific risk; the cost of the control is weighed against the risk it reduces. Risk is dynamic — likelihoods and impacts change as threats evolve and as the business changes. Mature security programs maintain a formal risk register and revisit it periodically.
  • Why it matters to a defender: you cannot fix everything. Risk = likelihood × impact tells you what to fix today.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [[likelihood]], [[impact]], [asset], [threat], [vulnerability]
  • Reference: NIST SP 800-30 — Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments

Asset

  • Hebrew: נכס
  • Acronym: —
  • Category: Risk management
  • Short: Something of value worth protecting — data, a system, a service, or a reputation.
  • Long: Assets are the things that risk affects. Tangible assets include servers, files, networks. Intangible assets include customer trust, brand reputation, and intellectual property. Security work begins with knowing what your assets are and what they’re worth.
  • Why it matters to a defender: asset inventory is the foundation of risk assessment. You can’t protect what you don’t know you have.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [risk], [threat], [vulnerability]
  • Reference: NIST SP 800-30

Threat

  • Hebrew: איום
  • Acronym: —
  • Category: Risk management
  • Short: Something that could harm an asset — an attacker, malware, a natural event, or human error.
  • Long: Threats are the “who” or “what” side of the risk equation. Threats vary by motivation and capability. Threat modeling — a structured exercise to enumerate likely threats — is a core security-engineering practice.
  • Why it matters to a defender: understanding threats lets you predict which vulnerabilities matter most. A vulnerability with no realistic threat may be lower priority than one with active threat actors targeting it.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [[threat-actor]], [vulnerability], [risk]
  • Reference: NIST SP 800-30

Vulnerability

  • Hebrew: חולשה / פגיעות
  • Acronym: —
  • Category: Risk management
  • Short: A weakness in a system or process that a threat can exploit to harm an asset.
  • Long: Vulnerabilities can be technical (unpatched software, weak passwords, misconfigured access) or non-technical (untrained staff, missing processes). They are catalogued globally in the CVE database. A vulnerability becomes risk only when combined with a threat that can exploit it and an asset worth harming.
  • Why it matters to a defender: vulnerability management is a daily security job. Prioritise by combining CVE severity with the asset’s value and the threat’s interest.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [risk], [threat], [[cve]]
  • Reference: MITRE CVE — https://cve.mitre.org/

Likelihood × Impact

  • Hebrew: סבירות × השפעה
  • Acronym: —
  • Category: Risk equation
  • Short: The standard simple model for ranking risks: how probable the event is, multiplied by how severe the consequences would be.
  • Long: This is the workhorse formula behind real-world risk prioritisation. Both factors are often expressed qualitatively (Low / Medium / High) or with simple scales (1–5). Sophisticated programs add factors like asset value and control effectiveness, but the core insight remains: easy and severe = fix first; hard and minor = can wait.
  • Why it matters to a defender: the rule that organises every weekly backlog. Use it when justifying decisions to non-technical stakeholders.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [risk], [[cvss]]
  • Reference: NIST SP 800-30 §3.2

Risk Treatment (Mitigate, Transfer, Accept, Avoid)

  • Hebrew: טיפול בסיכון (הפחתה / העברה / קבלה / הימנעות)
  • Acronym: —
  • Category: Risk management
  • Short: The four ways an organisation can respond to a known risk: reduce it with a control (Mitigate), shift it to another party such as insurance (Transfer), decide to live with it (Accept), or stop doing the risky activity (Avoid).
  • Long: Every identified risk gets one of these four treatments, ideally documented. Mitigate is the most common (this is where security controls live). Transfer includes cyber-insurance and contractual risk shifting. Accept is legitimate when likelihood × impact is small relative to mitigation cost — must be explicit, not silent. Avoid is rare but real (e.g., decide not to enter a regulated market).
  • Why it matters to a defender: the decision menu when you bring a risk to leadership.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [risk], [[cyber-insurance]]
  • Reference: ISO 31000 — Risk management guidelines

Defense in Depth

  • Hebrew: הגנה רב-שכבתית
  • Acronym: —
  • Category: Security architecture principle
  • Short: Layering multiple independent controls so no single failure is catastrophic.
  • Long: Defense in depth (also called “layered security”) is the architectural answer to “no control is perfect.” If a file is protected by access control AND encryption AND integrity monitoring AND backup AND network segmentation, an attacker must defeat multiple independent layers — and the defender has multiple opportunities to detect and recover. The trade-off is operational complexity; layers cost money and time to maintain.
  • Why it matters to a defender: the most important architectural principle in security. Every later module in CSRP adds new layers.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [risk], [[zero-trust]]
  • Reference: NIST SP 800-160 Vol 1 — Engineering Trustworthy Secure Systems

Course-meta vocabulary

CSRP

  • Hebrew: CSRP
  • Acronym: CSRP = Cyber Security Responder & Practitioner
  • Category: Course / certification path
  • Short: This 40-lesson, 160-hour bootcamp from Cyber School in partnership with BDO Ziv Haft.
  • Long: CSRP trains beginners into defender-practitioner roles ready for SOC, IR, and adjacent positions. Aligned to ISC2 CC; includes elements of LPI Linux and Python (PCAP). Each lesson combines theory + hands-on labs on onyxium.io + a Challenge that earns a badge. Module-level tests + challenges grant module badges; the full course ends with a final test + final challenge + the CSRP Certificate.
  • Why it matters to a defender: this is your program.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [[isc2-cc]], [[onyxium-records-console]]
  • Reference: CSRP syllabus

ISC2 CC

  • Hebrew: הסמכת ISC2 CC
  • Acronym: ISC2 = International Information System Security Certification Consortium; CC = Certified in Cybersecurity
  • Category: Certification
  • Short: ISC2’s entry-level cybersecurity certification — the credential CSRP is aligned to.
  • Long: ISC2 CC covers five domains: (1) Security Principles, (2) Business Continuity / DR / Incident Response, (3) Access Controls, (4) Network Security, (5) Security Operations. The CSRP course maps every lesson to one or more CC domains, so completion strongly prepares learners for the CC exam.
  • Why it matters to a defender: widely-recognised entry credential; many junior cyber roles list CC as a hiring preference.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [csrp]
  • Reference: https://www.isc2.org/certifications/cc

Meridian Records Console

  • Hebrew: מסוף הרשומות של Meridian
  • Acronym: —
  • Category: CSRP educational simulator (L1)
  • Short: The browser-based simulator used in CSRP Lesson 1 — a fictional records-management system at Meridian Corp with three panels: Files & Access, Services, and Integrity Monitor.
  • Long: Built for CSRP, the Meridian Records Console gives beginners a safe environment to practice all three CIA pillars in one tool — confidentiality (Files & Access), availability (Services), and integrity (Integrity Monitor). All data is synthetic. No CLI, no OS, no real network. The simulator is themed around Meridian Corp, a fictional company that recurs across later lessons.
  • Why it matters to a defender: the simulator is the first tool you ever use as a defender in this course.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [[onyxium]], [csrp]
  • Reference: CSRP L1 Oxy Lab Build Spec

Badge

  • Hebrew: סיכה / תג הסמכה
  • Acronym: —
  • Category: Course / credentialing
  • Short: A verifiable digital credential awarded on completion of a CSRP Challenge, recorded on the learner’s profile.
  • Long: Each CSRP lesson awards one badge for passing the Challenge. Each module awards a module badge for passing the module test + module challenge. The course ends with the CSRP Certificate. Badges are designed to be shareable to LinkedIn and recognisable to employers — they prove specific verified skills, not just attendance.
  • Why it matters to a defender: the artifact that proves what you can do. Employers care about evidence, not attendance.
  • First introduced in: Lesson 1
  • Related: [csrp], [[isc2-cc]]
  • Reference: Open Badges 3.0 standard

cyberPedia rendering notes

  • Each entry above maps to a single cyberPedia page.
  • The name is derived from the heading (slugified — e.g., “Three-way handshake” → three-way-handshake).
  • Cross-links ([[term-slug]]) become hyperlinks within the cyberPedia.
  • The “Short” field is used for tooltip previews; the “Long” field is the full page body.
  • The “Why it matters to a defender” field is featured prominently — it’s what distinguishes this from a generic glossary.
  • Terms tagged with First introduced in: Lesson N allow filtering by lesson progress.